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Introduction 
Wendy J. Gordon t 
Ralph Sharp Brown crossed out the "Junior" that followed his name 
after his father died. In explanation of the hand-altered stationery, he said 
(if my recollection holds), "I'm the only one left now." Now, after Ralph's 
death, there may remain no Ralph Sharp Browns. But there are many law 
teachers who continue to wage the campaign that Ralph made his life work: 
to save an interdependent society from unnecessary and stagnating 
restraints on liberty.1 In the intellectual property area, Ralph sought to teach 
us that it can be both right and necessary to give individuals the liberty to 
"reap without sowing," and that we should fear the excessive protectionism 
that can result from an overblown and ungenerous sense of what's "due" to 
property claimants. 
Ralph himself was far too modest to claim that his goal was "saving 
society" and much too kind to deride his opponents' broad sense of 
property rights as immature or grasping. But consider the article reprinted 
herein, Advertising and the Public Interest.2 In it, Ralph identified two 
competing premises for the law of unfair competition.3 One premise was 
t Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston University. Thanks are owed 
to Jessica Litman for suggesting the format of the Symposium, and to her and other colleagues, 
such as Mark Lemley, Maureen O'Rourke, and Marc Poirier, for helpful critiques. This 
Introduction was largely inspired by Leo J. Raskind and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, longtime 
friends of Ralph who spoke in his honor at the 1999 meeting of the Association of American Law 
Schools. 
1. See Robert A. Gorman, Tribute, A Tribute to Ralph S. Brown: Pioneer Scholar and 
Professorial Statesman, 108 YALEL.J. 1465, 1466 (1999); Anthony T. Kronman, Tribute, Citizen 
Brown, 108 YALEL.J. 1457, 1459-60 (1999). 
2. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 51 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948), reprinted in 108 YALE L.J. 1619 (1999). Page citations in 
this Introduction and subsequent Symposium pieces will reference the original 1948 pagination, 
which appears in bracketed italics in this Issue's reprint. 
3. The Jaw of unfair competition is subsumed today under the Jaw of "intellectual property." 
Trademark Jaw was the branch of intellectual property law that Ralph addressed in Advertising 
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that the law should prohibit all "poaching," 4 all "reap[ing] where one has 
not sown." 5 The other premise was that the law should follow " 'the basic 
common law policy of encouraging competition"' 6 and imitation. Ralph 
initially pretended to be agnostic between these premises,7 but he soon 
revealed his true preference: fostering a liberty to copy.8 He placed a heavy 
burden of persuasion on those who sought exceptions. 
By no means did Ralph oppose all such exceptions; he actively 
supported many of the restraints that intellectual property law imposes. For 
example, his article made clear that society will be better off in the long run 
if trademark law can enjoin a stranger's deceptive and confusing use of an 
established mark.9 The Advertising piece even takes several steps that, 
though uncontroversial today, were pro-plaintiff when the piece was 
written.10 
That Ralph was the opposite of a fanatic can also be seen in the 
interstitial nature of the suggestions he made to limit plaintiffs' rights. In 
the Advertising article, Ralph urged courts to require a plaintiff to make 
some meaningful showing that the "confusion" allegedly resulting from a 
defendant's use of a trade symbol would actually be material to consumer 
and the Public Interest. As Robert Denicola's essay in this Symposium demonstrates, Ralph's 
writings and interests ranged over the entire field, from copyright through trademark and patent, 
to the interests of free speech and free competition. See Robert C. Denicola, The Freedom To 
Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1661 (1999). Unfortunately, if this Symposium is to have a unity, it 
can only address a portion of Ralph's life work. For his additional contributions-to labor law, to 
First Amendment law, to the cause of liberty generally-the reader need only turn to the Tributes 
printed in this Issue. 
4. Brown, supra note 2, at 1166. 
5. Id. at 1200 & n.147. 
6. Id. at 1166 & n.6 (quoting Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 
959 (2d Cir. 1943)). 
7. See id. at 1166. 
8. Ralph himself claimed only to be indulging in "an attempt to redress the balance" that 
had, he said, sometimes resulted from unfair competition law's "emphasis on unfairness." Id. at 
1203. But what undue "emphasis" was there to be redressed? Ralph had claimed that blindered 
solicitude for the hard-working plaintiff was only a minority strain. See id. He was in my view 
working not to redress a balance, but to disabuse that erring minority of its distaste for copying. 
That the latter was his goal is clear both from the totality of the Advenising piece and from his 
later work. See id.; Denicola, supra note 3, at 1662-69. Whether or not pro-plaintiff sentiment was 
a minority influence in 1948, today both legislatures and courts indeed show an excessive 
solicitude for intellectual property plaintiffs, as the contributions to this Symposium show. See id. 
at 1672-74; Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1697-1714 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in 
the Advertising Age, 108 YALEL.J. 1717, 1721-25 (1999). We need Ralph's voice now more than 
ever. 
9. See Brown, supra note 2, at 1203-04. 
10. First, the article accepts the desirability of allowing a plaintiff to enjoin confusing uses of 
marks even when the defendant's goods do not compete with the plaintiff's own goods, as long as 
the two parties' products are sufficiently related in type that the use of a common symbol would 
deceive consumers. See id. at 1192, 1193 n.113. Second, the article recommends that courts allow 
trademark suits to proceed even if consumers do not know the source's specific identity, as long 
as they associate the mark with a constant, if anonymous, source. See id. at 1188-91. 
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purchasing decisions.11 Ralph also suggested that courts reject "the unwary 
purchaser" as a standard by which to measure likelihood of confusion.12 
Courts should instead restore the standard of "the reasonably careful 
purchaser," a creature more realistic and more discerning.13 In sum, the 
courts should be a little less gullible about "confusion." The pieces by 
Mark Lemley and Jessica Litman in this Symposium highlight 
developments that in my opinion show that the legal system would have 
been much better off if Ralph's 1948 warning had been heeded.14 
Ralph's final set of suggestions in the Advertising piece involved 
preserving, as the touchstone of trademark law, avoiding consumer 
confusion.15 For him, advertising that carried information was valuable, 
while advertising that carried mere persuasive force was either pernicious 
or useless.16 For Ralph, therefore, society had nothing to fear when a 
defendant's nondeceptive, nonconfusing use of a trademark diluted the 
mark's emotional punch, and the trademark owner had no normatively 
justifiable grounds for complaint. 
Here Ralph's rhetoric was broad. One can see why: If consumer 
confusion is avoided by trademark enforcement, then such enforcement will 
increase social welfare. But as Felix Cohen had seen (and as Ralph praised 
him for so seeing), 17 absent such confusion the economic benefit from 
enforcing rights in trade symbols is debatable, even doubtful. 18 
11. See id. at 1196-98. For fuller development of this central issue of "materiality," see 
Glynn Lunney, Trademark Monopolies 8-58 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The 
Yale Law Journal). 
12. Brown, supra note 2, at 1198. 
13. In explaining the standard of the "reasonably careful purchaser," Ralph viewed the 
standard of" the unwary purchaser'' as "a convenient front for advertisers." Id. For the stretches 
to which trademark law has been recently subjected in the supposed interest of the "credulous 
consumer," see Litman, supra note 8, at 1722. 
14. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1704-13; Litman, supra note 8, at 1721-25. 
15. See Brown, supra note 2, at 1195-98; Litman, supra note 8, at 1719-21. 
16. As Denicola's essay indicates, newer economic thinking suggests that economic benefits 
can result-even from advertising that carries no specific information about its product-if the 
intensity and frequency of the advertising accurately communicate the producer's confidence in 
its product and the product's popularity with consumers. See Denicola, supra note 3, at 1663-64. 
Although this insight might introduce a third category into Ralph's lexicon-adding "intensity 
advertising" alongside "persuasive" and "informative" advertising-it does not change Ralph's 
basic analysis. To the extent that the intensity advertising provides information that is useful to 
consumers' decisionmaking, it is desirable; to the extent that repetition functions as an 
emotionally compelling drumbeat, it is undesirable. 
Would the new category, "intensity advertising," have implications for trademark law? I 
doubt it would affect Ralph's distaste for legal attempts to safeguard a mark's emotional power. 
Even if advertising intensity does convey some rudimentary information that "this product is 
okay," it would be a giant step to presume that the accuracy of this message is threatened any 
time a famous mark is used commercially without the owner's consent. 
17. See Brown, supra note 2, at 1199 n.142 (referring to Cohen's analysis as "trenchant"). 
18. Cohen observed the following logic operating in many decisions: X has "created a thing 
of value; a thing of value is property; the creator of property is entitled to protection against third 
parties who seek to deprive him of his property." Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and 
the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935). Cohen noted the circularity of the 
value/property approach. He argued that "property from value" reasoning "pmports to base legal 
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Antidilution law purports to prohibit strangers from using famous 
marks even when the use threatens no confusion. This extension of 
trademark law may cause no large problems, as Lemley hopes, 19 but 
antidilution doctrines also have the potential to undermine the liberty our 
legal system now gives to those who market generic goods through 
comparative advertising20 or who parody established icons.21 One can only 
protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales 
device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected." Id. 
Following Cohen, the argument might run as follows: Placing a famous sports team's logo or 
trademark on tee-shirts makes the shirts more desirable than tee-shirts bearing less famous logos. 
If everyone can copy the team's mark without paying license fees for doing so, the marginal cost 
of copying will consist solely of the cost of the physical paint or dye process needed to affix the 
image; no costs will be attributable to the image itself. Price in a perfectly competitive market will 
equal marginal cost and long-run average cost. Because the copyist's average and marginal cost 
attributable to the famous mark are both zero, none of the price she charges for a shirt will include 
payment for the team's mark. The mark's value to any given seller is then zero. 
Rochelle Dreyfuss makes an observation parallel to Cohen's, but she draws from it a 
somewhat different point: When the competitive value of the intangible is competed away, the 
public, rather than the competitor, benefits. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: 
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 407 (1990). 
Admittedly, fans of strong trademark protection might argue that the immediate benefit to the 
public (in the form of free access to logos for their tee-shirts) would be outweighed by a loss in 
team or game quality as team owners lost some of their ability to monopolize logo merchandise. 
But that is an argument that would have to be empirically proved. Intellectual property tends to be 
most economically justifiable when protecting against free riding on a claimant's primary activity, 
such as a sports team's making championship game tapes, and more controversial when extended 
to marketing areas outside the primary activity. See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market 
Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 864-88 
(1992). 
The role of trade symbols today is complex. For valuable discussion, see Litman, supra note 
8. 
19. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1704. One hopeful development is that some courts are 
reading something like a "confusion" requirement back into antidilution provisions. See, e.g., 
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 875 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1989). 
This is one possibly legitimate result of the incoherence of the "antidilution" notion. But note that 
Mead Data predates the federal adoption of an antidilution statute. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) 
(West 1998). 
20. Judging from Ralph's admiration for price competition, see Brown, supra note 2, at 1204, 
he would have resisted "trademark as property" treatment particularly strongly where it might 
prevent a truthful comparative advertiser from explaining what famous product he is emulating. In 
at least one case, an antidilution cause of action has indeed been used in a way that threatened 
comparative advertising. See Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 858-59 (C.D. Cal. 
1985) (holding that the plaintiff could sue to prevent the defendant, the maker of a nail hardener, 
from referring to the plaintiff's more famous brand). This threat remains present under state 
antidilution laws, though the federal statute is more sensible. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4)(A) 
(providing that fair use of a famous mark in comparative advertising is not actionable under 
federal antidilution law). 
21. Consider the Pillsbury Doughboy case. See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 
U.S.P.Q. 124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (enjoining, because of its potential effect under Georgia 
antidilution law, a parody depicting the Pillsbury Doughboy engaging in sexual intercourse, 
despite finding the parody a "fair use" under copyright law). As for the federal antidilution cause 
of action, the Lanham Act's antidilution provision cannot be used against "[n]oncommercial 
use[s]," a category that may shelter parodies. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (West 1998); see also, 
e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding the 
song "Barbie Girl" not subject to the federal an ti dilution statute because the song fell \vi thin the 
"'noncommerical use of a mark' exception") (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4)(B)); Dr. Seuss 
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hope that Congress's recent decision to allow the owners of famous marks 
to sue in the absence of "consumer confusion" will not prove a disaster in 
terms of increased litigation costs and, most importantly, market 
constraints.22 
In addition to reminding us that transfers of funds from one set of hands 
to another may yield no increase to the total social product, Ralph also 
stressed that legal efforts to secure one distribution over another have no 
social desirability unless the total social product does increase, or the 
receiving hands deserve what they receive. Thus Ralph also turned his 
attention to the question of desert. Despite Ralph's claim to be neither 
philosopher nor psychologist, his article contains a normative social 
psychology23 that questions whether advertisers do more harm than good 
and whether competing newcomers are really as "shady" 24 as the courts 
often paint them. Their real sin, Ralph hinted, may be their newness.25 
Though Ralph claimed to take a "conservative" 26 position in the 
Advertising piece, the position was simply conservative in the sense that it 
sought to preserve traditional legal approaches to trademark law. It was not 
conservative in the sense of seeking to preserve and consolidate existing 
advantages. To the contrary, I understand Ralph as taking the status quo as 
his target, not his goal. 
The notion that the status quo ipso facto deserves protection is known 
by many names. It can be characterized as "possession providing a basis for 
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that a 
book using a parodic version of Dr. Seuss marks to reexamine the OJ. Simpson murder trial was 
not a commercial use, but nevertheless enjoining the parody on other grounds), aff'd, 109 F.3d 
1394 (9th Cir. 1997). But see American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., No. 98-CV-1923, 
1998 WL 915449, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 22, 1998) (holding that the defendant's use of "Dairy 
Queens" as the title of a film about dairy-country beauty contests was a commercial use subject to 
the federal antidilution provision). 
22. For a discussion of this development and its relation to Ralph's work, see Denicola, supra 
note 3, at 1665-66. Also, as Lemley's essay in this Symposium notes, the federal antidilution law 
is still fairly new. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1698. Conceivably it can be interpreted in ways 
that adhere fairly closely to Ralph's vision of desirable unfair competition law, see id. at 1704, or 
it can be blown into "trademark as property" with deleterious results. The latter is more likely. As 
Litman points out, even without the prompting of specific antidilution law, in recent decades 
many courts have blunted the teeth of the traditional requirement that plaintiffs prove likelihood 
of confusion. See Litman, supra note 8, at 1722-23. 
23. See, for example, Brown, supra note 2, at 1180-82, where Ralph, who referred to the 
"dogma of consumer autonomy," id. at 1181, stated that: "[A]nyone who questions the 
untrammelled use of influence by the seller and its uncoerced acceptance by the buyer is at best a 
Puritan, at worst a Fascist The debate seems to end in a defense of freedom .... But does the 
sovereign consumer have real freedom of choice?" Id. at 1181-82 (footnotes omitted). 
24. Id. at 1192 (questioning the courts' assumption "that a defendant who would jeopardize 
the plaintiff's advertising budget was in all probability a shady character"). 
25. Ralph wrote, presumably tongue well in cheek: "We have previously referred to 
defendant impartially as a copier or an imitator. Is he not also likely to be a cheat, a chiseler, and, 
worst of all, a newcomer?" Id. at 1203 (emphasis added). 
26. Id. at 1206. 
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title." 27 It might be folded into a "but-for" approach to causal 
maximalism:28 If you are a but-for cause of some value coming into 
existence, then you deserve to own it. The notion is equally associated with 
a kind of primitive corrective justice29 and is closely allied with the force 
that tries to equate "ought" and "is." The notion also captures how a first-
year law student initially visualizes "internalizing externalities" 30 or what 
is meant by "unjust enrichment." 31 Rochelle Dreyfuss is perhaps the most 
economical in the name she gives the notion: "if value, then right." 32 
This notion plays the strongest role in misappropriation actions. As 
Robert Denicola' s Symposium essay describes, misappropriation was the 
area of intellectual property law that most incensed Ralph.33 In the most 
famous misappropriation case, International News Service v. Associated 
27. See Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221 (1979). Note 
that for John Locke, possession did not give rise to justifiable title, unless resources that were 
"enough, and as good" were left for others. JOHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 228 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). For discussions of the relevance of the 
Lockean proviso to intellectual property, see, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in 
Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 
YALEL.J. 1533, 1555-72 (1993); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & 
~- AFF. 31 (1989); and Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 
287 (1988). 
28. The phrase belongs to H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore. They analyze and criticize Richard 
Epstein's view of tort law, characterizing Epstein as an "advocate [of] what we have termed 
'causal maximalism,' viz. the doctrine that causing harm is a necessary and sufficient condition of 
tort liability." H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN TIIE LAW at lxxiv (2d ed. 1985) 
(footnote omitted). If "causal maximalism" in tort law yields a doctrine that causing a loss is a 
sufficient basis for legally enforced responsibility, then "causal maximalism" in intellectual 
property law yields the corollary doctrine: that causing a benefit is a sufficient basis for legally 
enforced desert. 
29. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Infonnation: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 150-80 (1992); see also Wendy J. Gordon & Sam 
Postbrief, On Commodifying Intangibles, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 135-38 (1998) (book 
review). 
30. Students sometimes imagine that there is only one entity whose actions or characteristics 
impose a loss, and that if the law simply imposed the loss on that one entity, the resulting liability 
will "internalize the extemality" and automatically encourage economically desirable behavior. 
However, it always "takes two to tort" (using the apt phrase of Saul Levmore), and the Coase 
theorem reminds us that there are always multiple candidates for internalization. Thus, as Guido 
Calabresi explains, it is a difficult policy decision, and not a matter of simple fact, to determine 
"what is the cost of what." GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 133 (1970). 
31. Students are not the only ones who imagine that all unearned gains are unjust. Thus, in 
Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983), which held that a 
commodities futures contract pegged to the Dow Jones Average violates the common law rights 
of Dow Jones, Justice Simon, in dissent, chastised his brethren for being carried away by notions 
of unjust enrichment. See id. at 93 (Simon, J., dissenting); see also Gordon, supra note 29, at 196-
258 (arguing that unjust enrichment law does not lead to a wholesale adoption of the reap/sow 
notion, but at most to a narrow, tort-like cause of action, most unlike the strict liability causes of 
action that historically resulted from trespass on property). 
Ralph continually reminded us that we are all and always the recipients of unearned gains. 
Something more than "reaping without sowing" needs to be present before we are to be 
condemned as unjustly enriched. "A culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited 
within it." Gordon, supra note 29, at 167. 
32. Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 405. 
33. See Denicola, supra note 3, at 1680. 
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Press,34 Justice Holmes protested against the doctrine as much as Ralph did: 
"Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although 
exchangeable-a matter of fact." 35 To be less cryptic: Whether monetary 
value exists is a fact; whether it should be protected as property is a 
normative issue. 
This classic distinction between "is" and "ought" lies at the 
foundation of Ralph's work. Had Justice Holmes's INS opinion been as 
witty and well-written as Ralph's work, perhaps the /NS majority would 
have been persuaded to go the other way, and perhaps Ralph's campaign 
would already be victorious.36 Instead, trademark law and its various 
cousins seem to be expanding against all common sense under the vague 
umbrella that is misappropriation law's shaded (and shady) domain. 
If one imagined Ralph having a dialogue with himself, these sentences 
would stand out: "[A] persistent urge to create some general protection 
against copiers .... runs along like the Manichean heresy, forever pitting 
the forces of light against the alleged forces of darkness." 37 But "we are all 
imitators," 38 and "our society is committed to the proposition that progress 
is advanced by the free use and adaptation of novel things and ideas." 39 
And, most appropriately for Ralph's role as a generous mentor to many, he 
would insist: "Like other teachings, this lesson has now to be brought home 
to another generation." 40 It is fitting that, in this Issue of The Yale Law 
Journal, Ralph teaches his lesson again. 
34. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The majority upheld an injunction that prevented the International 
News Service from copying and rewriting news from Associated Press papers "until its 
commercial value as news ... had passed away." Id. at 232. 
35. Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
36. Ironies abound. In Advertising, the main didactic point is that the law should aid 
i11fonnational advertising but treat the persuasive advertiser as little better than a gambler's 
creditor. See Brown, supra note 2, at 1205-06. But the power of the Advertising piece itself 
largely lies in its persuasive language, its charmingly sly use of rhetoric, and its imagery. 
37. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Product Simulation: A Right or Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1216, 
1227 (1964). 
38. Brown, supra note 2, at 1205. To similar effect, Ralph cited his friend and coauthor 
Justice Benjamin Kaplan: "[I]f man has any 'natural' rights, not the least must be a right to 
imitate his fellows, and thus to reap where he has not sown." Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: 
An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1386 n.208 (1987) (quoting BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN 
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967)). 
39. Brown, supra note 2, at 1205. As our generation cites Ralph, he too felt the need to cite 
his elders. What is omitted from my imagined dialogue of Ralph with himself was Ralph's 
quotation of a few key sentences from Justice Brandeis-the same sentences that Ralph quoted 
again in the Product Simulation piece. Here is the quote to which Ralph twice paid deference: 
[Defendant] Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article 
known as "Shredded Wheat" ; and thus is sharing in a market which was created by the 
skill and judgment of plaintiff's predecessor and has been widely extended by vast 
expenditures in advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the 
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right 
possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply 
interested. 
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938), quoted in Brown, supra note 2, at 
1205; and Brown, supra note 37, at 1227. 
40. Brown, supra note 37, at 1227. 

